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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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15 December 1953


STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 418

SUBJECT: Alternative Version of NIE-90: Soviet Bloc Capabilities
Through Mid-1955

1. The attached draft is submitted as an exercise in connection with our efforts to improve the annual Soviet estimates. It represents an attempt to make NIE-90 discuss fairly strictly what the Bloc probably could do, as distinguished from NIE-95 which discusses what the Bloc probably will do, and the Appendices which list the resources that the Bloc has.

2. No special attempt has been made in preparing this draft to use the newest data, or even to make the best estimates. It is the form and not the substance which is submitted for appraisal.

3. Please note particularly that this paper is not to be confused with a revision of NIE-90, embodying later data, which is now under production by the EE Staff.



ABBOT SMITH

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

15 December 1953

NIE-90(A): SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES* THROUGH MID-1955

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the principal courses of action which are open to the Soviet Bloc for the accomplishment of its main objectives, through mid-1955.

NOTE

This estimate of Bloc capabilities is supplemented by Appendices giving an account of Bloc strengths and weaknesses during the period under consideration. A following estimate, NIE-95, will consider probable courses of action of the Bloc. The courses of action listed in the present Estimate are believed to be within the power of the Bloc, but it does not follow that the Bloc is likely to pursue all of them.

*The word capabilities is here understood in the sense of the definition in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage: "the capabilities of a nation represent the courses of action within the power of the nation for accomplishing its national objectives in peace or war."

BLOC OBJECTIVES

1. Despite the death of Stalin and the accession to power of a new generation of Soviet rulers, we see no sign that the ideological dynamism of the Communist regime is abating, and we believe that the Communist rulers remain profoundly convinced that permanent hostility exists between the Communist and the free worlds. Their basic objectives, therefore, continue to be an expansion of their own sphere of power and the eventual domination of the non-Communist world.

2. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communist rulers will continue to consider general war a hazardous gamble, involving at a minimum the certainty of widespread destruction in the USSR and at the same time carrying with it the risk that the Soviet system itself would be destroyed. They know that the US has superior strategic air power and naval capabilities, a larger atomic stockpile, and greater industrial potential, although they probably estimate that the USSR is making substantial progress toward reducing its disadvantages in these respects. We believe therefore that the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of action which in its judgment might involve substantial risk of general war.

3. Certain basic elements of the Communist concept of struggle against the non-Communist world appear to have been confirmed by the

Nineteenth Party Congress of October 1952, and by doctrinal utterances since Stalin's death. One is that the struggle will continue through a whole historical epoch, with historical forces working inevitably to favor the increase of Communist and the decline of "capitalist" power. Unremitting struggle on the part of the Communist is an essential part of this process, but an early resolution of the contest is not necessarily to be expected and need not be sought. Another Communist principle is that the form of the global struggle is not necessarily military, except possible in its final and cataclysmic stage, when the capitalist nations become desperate as their power wanes and their instability increases.

4. We therefore believe that the Communist rulers do not expect to achieve world domination in the period of this estimate, either by initiation general war or by other means. We believe that the broad objectives towards which Communist courses of action will be directed during the period of this estimate are as follows:

- (a) Maintenance of the security of the Bloc, and especially of the USSR.

- (b) Maintenance and strengthening of the political cohesion of the Bloc.

- (c) Increase of the economic and military potential of the Bloc, according to long-range rather than short-range plans.

5. Among the large number of Communist objectives subsidiary to those listed in the preceding paragraph, two are likely to be of particular importance during the period of this estimate:

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(a) Consolidation of power within the USSR and the Bloc by the successors to Stalin.

(b) Prevention of the rearmament of West Germany and the integration of that country into the Western alliance.

COURSES OF ACTION WITHIN THE BLOC

POLITICAL

6. The present rulers of the USSR received from Stalin a vast governmental machine, cumbersome and inefficient in many respects but on the whole in good working order. They took it over quietly, without apparent disorder or difficulty. They were themselves the disciples and partners of Stalin, trained by him in the ideas and procedures of the system which they were to inherit. Thus, while Stalinism could not continue wholly unchanged without Stalin, the broad courses of action open to the new rulers in the domestic political situation were probably not very numerous or diverse. Malenkov and his associates could have slightly relaxed or perhaps slightly increased the severities of totalitarian rule, but we believe that, practically speaking, it was not within their capabilities to move very far in either direction even had they wished to do so.

7. Over the longer run, however, Soviet rulers will probably find it difficult to avoid some modification of their regime in response to social and economic developments. Living standards will almost

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certainly rise in the USSR; the number of educated people will increase; bureaucratic and managerial groups with vested interests in comfort and security will become more important. Soviet rulers may for the sake of public morale and continued high economic productivity be almost compelled to relax the extreme rigors of the police state. If they wish to escape this compulsion, however, they can create tension abroad in order to justify severity at home. This course of action could be adopted speedily and at almost any time. On the other hand, the weight of ideology, tradition, and practice in the Soviet regime is so great that liberalization could only be a slow process, scarcely perceptible within a time such as the period of this estimate. Moreover, we believe that the Soviet rulers could not, consistently with their training, aims, and ideology, allow liberalization to go very far without taking steps to reverse the trend.

8. Struggles for power among members of a ruling group are virtually inevitable, especially in a totalitarian regime, and may become so intense as to weaken the regime or even to produce prolonged public disorder. Thus far such conflicts within the Kremlin appear not to have approached this degree of seriousness. The fall of Beria was quickly and efficiently accomplished. We have no evidence that any individual or group within the USSR is capable of impairing the authority of the present rulers.

9. Neither do we have evidence of any groups or individuals within the Satellite countries or Communist China capable of over-

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throwing the governments. There is ample evidence of popular disaffection, especially in the European Satellites, but we do not consider that such disaffection is well enough organized or strong enough to constitute a serious threat to these regimes during the period of this estimate.

10. We believe that it is not within the capability of any European Satellite government to free itself from the control of Moscow within the period of this estimate, even if it should wish to do so.

11. The capabilities of the Chinese Communist government vis-a-vis the USSR are far greater than those of the European Satellites. Allegiance to Moscow is not assured by the presence of Soviet troops, as it is in some of the Satellites. Moreover, the size and potential of China give it unique standing among Communist states; the history and accomplishments of Mao give him extraordinary prestige in the world Communist movement. We believe that the position of the Communist regime in China is so strong that a break with Moscow might be within its power during the period of this estimate. The Kremlin probably has to reckon on this possibility in conducting its relations with Peiping, and it is almost certain that Mao can exert substantial influence in Moscow, especially with respect to Communist policy in Asia. On the other hand, Mao's dependence on the USSR for military and economic support makes it impossible for him, while continuing to be a member of the Bloc, to act far contrary to the wishes of the Kremlin without endangering the program, and perhaps the existence, of his regime.

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ECONOMIC

12. In all countries of the Bloc the economy is controlled and directed by government. To a less degree the economy of the Bloc as a whole is integrated and controlled from Moscow. Thus, within limits imposed by the availability of physical resources and by the skills, discipline, and morale of the people, economic activity throughout the Bloc can be directed towards objectives set by the Kremlin.

13. For a long time the primary objectives of Soviet economic policy have been the rapid build-up of heavy industry and military production. Of late years these aims have also been established for most of the Satellite economies. Totalitarian controls give Communist rulers the capability of forcing a rapid rate of capital investment despite the extremely low living standards of the population, and economic development has thus been pointed as directly as possible towards the increase of Soviet power. This course of action accounts in part for a rate of increase in Bloc industrial and military production far above that of the principal Western countries. It has also caused extensive popular dissatisfaction with the various Communist regimes, especially in some of the European Satellites.

14. In recent months clear evidence has appeared of a re-examination by Bloc rulers of their economic policies. Satellite leaders have publicly confessed their programs of development for heavy industry to be beyond the capabilities of their countries. Soviet leaders have

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admitted a lack of balance in economic development, and have declared an intention to produce a substantially larger amount of consumers' goods than had previously been planned. The development of agriculture within the entire Bloc has been revealed to be seriously lagging, and remedial measures have been announced. We do not believe, however, that fundamental objectives have changed. Development of heavy industry and military production continue to receive highest priority; Bloc leaders claim only to be correcting an under-emphasis on other sectors of the economy. They will devote a greater effort than before to production of consumers' goods and improvement of the food supply, but it does not follow that heavy industry and military production will be relegated to second place.

15. During the years 1948-1952, the gross national product of the USSR increased at an average annual rate of percent; for the Bloc as a whole the figure was about percent. This rate -- very high by normal Western standards -- was owing in part to a government policy forcing large capital investments, but also to the fact that the time was still to some degree one of recovery from World War II. The rapid advances of the period of recovery are now complete, however; henceforth growth must inevitably be a slower process. We believe that the Bloc is capable, during the period of this estimate, of maintaining a rate of economic growth substantially above that likely to be maintained in any major Western country, but we do not believe that the Bloc can continue at the rapid rate of 1948-1952. Moreover, as mentioned above, Bloc leaders seem for the immediate future to be more concerned with

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improving the general balance of their economies than with achieving the highest possible annual increase of gross national product.

16. In allocating resources among the various sectors of the economy Bloc leaders could, in order to increase the production of consumers' goods, cut heavy industry and/or military production to the point where output began to decline below present levels. We believe, however, that such a course of action would not be in accord with stated Bloc economic objectives, or with the over-all aim of increasing Bloc power. The following are alternatives:

(a) The USSR can probably produce a substantially larger amount of consumers' goods than it has been producing in the past, without reducing the present level of output of producers' goods and military end-items. The future rate of increase in annual output of producers' goods and military end-items would nevertheless be reduced below what it would have been if such increase in production of consumer goods did not take place.

(b) The USSR could purchase considerable amounts of consumers' goods from abroad, without involving non-Communist countries in violations of present regulations concerning East-West trade. These goods could be paid for in gold (of which the USSR stock is estimated to be from \$3 to \$5 billion), or in certain Bloc products or both.

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17. It is possible that a reduction in the output of military end-items below present levels could be effected in the USSR without reducing the capabilities of Soviet armed forces. There is reason to believe that Soviet forces at present levels of strength have been adequately reequipped since World War II, and that a continuing expansion of production of standard military items, especially artillery, vehicles, and tanks, may be unnecessary.

18. We therefore believe the USSR is capable of increasing the supply of consumers' goods available to the public without substantially slowing down the development of heavy industry or so reducing the output of military end-items as to impair Bloc power.

19. Agriculture throughout the Bloc is carried on under grave difficulties, of which the chief are: (a) the hostility of the peasantry to Communist forms of agricultural organization; (b) current inefficient methods and techniques; (c) the lack of additional arable land beyond that now cultivated; and (d) the basic technical difficulties of increasing productivity on land presently cultivated. In attempting to deal with these problems the Communists can produce more tractors, and send more agricultural specialists to the farms. They can increase the production and distribution of fertilizer. They can slow down the process of collectivization, and offer incentives to peasants to produce more, but they cannot carry such incentives too far without jeopardizing their plans for the development of large-scale collectivised, agricultural organizations.

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20. We therefore believe that the Soviets are capable only of slow and difficult progress in raising agricultural production. Even such limited progress is likely to require a very large amount of attention and effort by the Soviet leaders and bureaucracy. It may involve compromises, at least temporary, of essential Communist principles in order to gain the cooperation of the peasants. It may involve the disaffection of other groups if the peasants are unduly favored, and the disaffection of peasants if favors are not granted, or if granted are afterwards withdrawn. In every way, the agricultural problem is likely to prove recalcitrant and perhaps almost insuperable throughout the Bloc.

21. Communist China has undertaken its own program of economic development comprising industrialization, development of communications and transportation, and the increase of agricultural production. Even with the greatest effort, however, China will be incapable of becoming a major industrial power for many years. The speed of its development will be limited by lack of capital equipment, by the inadequate training of the Chinese in industrial methods, and by the lack of adequate transportation and communications. The Kremlin also can directly influence the speed of economic development in Communist China by the amount of capital goods and technical assistance which it decides to allocate to China from the USSR.

22. Even more important in influencing the economic development of Communist China during the period of this estimate will be the

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decisions which the Chinese leaders make between the requirements of their economic program and the temptations of various adventures in foreign aggression. We believe that Communist China would not be capable of pushing its economic program if it should resume large-scale military activity in Korea. Chinese Communist armed intervention in Indochina or Burma could likewise be carried on only at considerable cost to the economic development program; especially if China became involved in war with the US.

23. In the Bloc as a whole, integration and interaction of the economies of the various countries has steadily increased, even though we do not believe that detailed planning and control is exercised from one center. Trade between Bloc countries has very greatly expanded, and has largely replaced trade between Bloc countries and the non-Communist world. The Bloc could become self-sufficient -- i.e., it could dispense with all trade with non-Communist countries -- at any time within the period of this estimate, if Bloc rulers should decide that such a policy was desirable.

Military Build-up - Nuclear Weapons

24. If Soviet rulers carry out their announced policies for the production of more consumers' goods, the development of agriculture, and the continued development of heavy industry, it will not be within their capabilities to carry through simultaneously a pronounced further increase in the size of the armed forces. Present programs do allow,

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however, for continued gradual re-equipping of the air forces with jet aircraft, for building of submarines and some surface naval vessels, and for progressive modernization and standardization of weapons and equipment in the ground forces.

25. Assuming that the entire amount of fissionable material available to the USSR is fabricated into weapons, we believe that by mid-1955 the USSR may have about 300 weapons of 30 - 100 kiloton yield. In view of our uncertainty concerning Soviet production of fissionable materials, particularly uranium - 235, the actual number of nuclear weapons may be as low as two-thirds or as high as twice this estimate. In the event that the USSR should choose to stockpile weapons of smaller or larger yield, the number of weapons in the stockpile would be altered accordingly.

26. On the basis of information now available on the Soviet explosion of 12 August 1953, it is concluded that the USSR is capable of producing air delivery type nuclear weapons with explosive powers in the range of a few thousand tons of TNT to approximately one million tons of TNT. Throughout this range thermonuclear reactions may be used to increase the energy yield from the fissionable materials present without directly contributing a substantial amount to the total energy yield. Having demonstrated the capability to utilize thermonuclear reactions to increase energy yields from fissionable materials, the Soviets may direct efforts toward the eventual modification of the estimated stockpile

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of 30 to 100 KT weapons in one or more of the following ways:

- (a) Increase the number of 30 to 100 KT weapons.
- (b) Increase the energy yield per weapon in the stockpile, the number being approximately the same.
- (c) Produce very high yield weapons (e.g., 500-1,000 KT) by accepting corresponding reductions in the total number of weapons in the stockpile.

The 12 August test may also indicate an advanced stage, but not the culmination, of a thermonuclear program having as an objective the production of weapons yielding more than a million tons of TNT in which thermonuclear reactions directly contribute a substantial amount to the total energy yield.

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COURSES OF ACTION IN RELATIONS WITH THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD

General

27. Considered in the broadest terms, the Kremlin has four courses of action open to it to achieve its objective of weakening and disrupting the non-Communist world:

(a) It can increase international tensions, heighten fears of general war throughout the world, and widen the gulf between Communist and non-Communist societies. Bloc leaders might estimate that this course of action would frighten some non-Communist governments and peoples into policies furthering Communist aims. They might also consider that such a course of action would improve morale and discipline in the Communist movement both inside and outside the Bloc.

(b) It can diminish international tensions, lessen fears of war, and promote the peaceful co-existence of the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Bloc leaders might estimate that this course of action would lead to a relaxation of defense effort in important non-Communist countries, and to difficulties and divisions within the Western alliance. They might also consider that such a course of action would provide a favorable atmosphere for economic development within Bloc countries.

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(c) It can mingle elements from these two courses of action. Bloc leaders might estimate that such a combination, if skillfully managed, would offer many of the advantages and avoid the main disadvantages of either course of action taken separately. Moreover, such a blend of apparently inconsistent policies might confuse the peoples and governments of the non-Communist world and lead them to unclear and indecisive policies.

(d) Finally, the Bloc could initiate, or could accept, general war against any or all states of the non-Communist world, or could wage local war in territories on the periphery of the Bloc. It is possible, though extremely unlikely, that the Kremlin would estimate that its chances of achieving its objectives by general war, within the period of this estimate, were good enough to outweigh the risks of such a war to the security and the existence of the Bloc. It is also possible, though again extremely unlikely, that the Kremlin would consider, during the period of this estimate, that the security of the Bloc was so threatened by the growth of Western military power as to make general war the only remaining recourse. Finally, it is also possible that the Kremlin might estimate that the advantages to be gained by some act of local military aggression outweighed the risks that such aggression would lead to general war.

28. In pursuing one or another of the broad courses of action described, the Bloc has open to it various methods and combinations of methods. These

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include: propaganda and front activities; the fomenting of civil unrest, civil war, colonial revolt and other acts of violence; sabotage; the exploitation of nationalist and revolutionary movements; economic warfare; the action of Communist parties and Communist-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc; subversion, and the infiltration of Communists or their sympathizers into key governmental posts; diplomatic action, both through normal governmental channels and in such international organizations as the UN; and the use of military force. Each of these methods offers various advantages and disadvantages, and presents Bloc leaders with further alternative courses of action.

Propaganda

29. The fundamental line of Communist propaganda is anti-capitalism. Since "capitalism" is interpreted by Communists to signify the entire social, economic, and political system of the more advanced non-Communist nations, the courses of action open to Bloc leaders in conducting propaganda are almost unlimited. They can attack at any point and at any time. Though the intensity of attack can be reduced at will, it would be impossible for Communist leaders, consistently with their ideology and training, to refrain from some degree of continuous propaganda against practically all aspects of life in the non-Communist world.

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30. More significant than such routine harassing are the alternatives open to Bloc leaders in deciding on the content of intensive propaganda campaigns, and choosing the groups or relations towards which such campaigns are to be directed. The general theme of "peace" has for several years been most insistently and successfully pursued by Bloc propagandists, using many techniques and methods. By choosing this theme, Bloc leaders accepted some limitations on their subsequent freedom of selection; they would find it difficult, for example, while representing the USSR as the true friend of peace, to pursue simultaneously a war of nerves on a grand scale, in the style of Hitler. Meanwhile, however, intensive Bloc propaganda campaigns against the US, and against the rearmament of West Germany, while each having its own characteristic content, have easily been fitted into the broad context of the "peace" movement.

31. The resources and techniques of propaganda are so numerous and complex that it would be fruitless to attempt a list of Bloc capabilities in this respect save in the most general way. The Bloc can incite the peoples of colonial or underdeveloped areas against the US, the UK, France, and other principal non-Communist powers. It can rouse the "people" of non-Communist states against their "rulers." It can stimulate French fears of Germany, European dislike and distrust of the US, Asian hatred of the West. It can play upon natural human desires for peace and security, and promote the growth of

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neutralist tendencies, presenting itself as the proponent of peace and the US as the instigator of war. It can magnify the errors and shortcomings, both real and invented, of the US and the non-Communist world, and it can urge the strength and virtue of Communism.

32. The Kremlin has formidable propaganda capabilities, as yet largely unused, in exploiting the threat of nuclear weapons. Bloc leaders may choose to continue their comparative restraint on this subject during the period of this estimate, perhaps because they will wish to avoid arousing fears among their own peoples. On the other hand, as the USSR increases its supply of fissionable materials it acquires the basis for a campaign of terror. Such a campaign might be long drawn out, depending upon a gradual and cumulative impact, or it might be sudden and intense, launched perhaps at a time of crisis in East-West relations. The unprecedented power of nuclear weapons may yet give rise to unprecedented propaganda techniques for exploiting the dread these weapons inspire.

Revolt, Subversion, Coup d'Etat, Acts of Violence and Sabotage.

33. In virtually every country of the non-Communist world there exists a hard core of Communists who have the capability at almost all times of committing acts of violence, sabotage, and perhaps of armed revolt. Isolated or sporadic acts of terrorism or violence, however, are not often undertaken by Communists, who are likely to consider as acceptable courses of action only those which they estimate would contribute substantially to the furtherance of Bloc objectives.

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34. The Communists are almost certainly capable of continuing their effort in Indochina at its present proportions for the period of this estimate; they could substantially increase the scale of warfare only with additional assistance from outside. Chinese Communist forces could enter Indochina covertly in considerable strength, or could intervene openly to the number of about 125,000 to 150,000. We believe that the Viet Minh could absorb logistical support from Communist China at a rate perhaps twice that now obtaining.

35. In Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines the strength of the armed Communist revolts has markedly diminished during past months. We believe that the Communists will not be able, during the period of this estimate, to reinvigorate the revolts in Malaya and the Philippines to a significant degree. However, the Chinese Communists could strengthen the Communist revolt in Burma to almost any extent they chose, by sending supplies, advice, and actual armed assistance.

36. In Italy, France, Iran, Iceland,, the Communist movement is strong enough and well enough organized to undertake armed revolts of proportions sufficient, if properly timed, to create extensive disorder possibly approaching the dimensions of civil war. Except in Iceland, we believe that the security forces of the governments concerned would, under present circumstances almost certainly be able eventually to restore order. Therefore, in deciding whether or not to undertake armed revolt in these countries, Communist leaders would have to estimate whether the effort would contribute sufficiently to the achievement of Bloc objectives to offset the adverse effects of its suppression.

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37. The strength of the indigenous Communist movement is not great enough in any other non-Communist country to make armed rebellion a course of action likely under any circumstances to yield profitable results to the Bloc.

38. Communists can often encourage, support, and sometimes eventually dominate movements of revolt and rebellion which are non-Communist in origin -- especially nationalist movements in underdeveloped areas. The war in Indochina grew out of such Communist support for an uprising originally nationalist in character. The presently active Nationalist movements in French North Africa do not depend on Communist support, and we do not believe that Communists will be capable of dominating these movements within the period of this estimate; they can, however, gradually increase their support of and contact with these movements. Likewise in British East Africa, the Communists can capitalize upon indigenous violence, and make some progress toward gaining control of the movement but we do not believe that the Communists can achieve such control within the period of this estimate.

39. We do not believe that the Communists could, within the period of this estimate, attain a significant position in rebellious movements elsewhere in the non-Communist world.

40. Communists are capable of acts of sabotage in a very large number of places and installations in the non-Communist world. Of those, some are of substantial importance to Western security interests:

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- a. US lines of communication in France.
- b. Oil fields and installations in Venezuela.
- c. Etc.

Economic Warfare

41. Non-Communist countries are not dependent upon the Bloc for strategic materials, and it is therefore not within Communist capabilities to deprive them of strategic materials by trade restrictions. Moreover, non-Communist countries are not, taken as a whole, dependent upon trade with the Bloc for economic health, and the Bloc therefore cannot materially affect the economy of the West as a whole by manipulating trade.

42. Various individual non-Communist countries, however, especially Finland, Italy, Egypt, Iceland, are already so far dependent upon trade with the Bloc that the Bloc could, by restricting such trade, cause appreciable economic dislocations in those countries. Moreover, we believe that the Bloc could, over a period of years, substantially increase its trade with some of these countries. Once such a pattern of increased trade had been established, the Bloc might be in a position to exert substantial influence over those countries by threatening to disturb the pattern. Bloc capabilities in this respect would be increased in the event of an economic recession in the non-Communist world.

43. The Bloc can also hold out attractive prospects of benefits that might be achieved for the economies of many Western countries by a substantial increase

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in East-West trade. We believe that the Bloc is not capable of fulfilling these prospects except perhaps to a small number of countries. Nevertheless, by arousing hopes the Bloc can provoke discontent among the peoples of the Western Alliance with restrictions on East-West trade, even in strategic commodities, and can arouse antagonism to the US as the presumed instigator of these restrictions. This capability also would greatly increase in the event of Western economic recession.

Political Activities of Communist Parties Outside the Bloc.

44. The activities of Communist political parties in non-Communist states generally tend towards one of two alternatives:

a. To adopt an attitude of hostility to the constitutional system, to other political parties, and to the government; to disrupt parliamentary proceedings; to defend, more or less openly, the interests of the USSR against the interests of their own country. This course of action generally results in cutting the Communist party down to its hard core of dedicated members, with a corresponding improvement in discipline. It preserves the Communist ideological position, free from the compromises required by the alternative course of action.

b. To seek alliance with sympathetic groups or parties in "united national fronts"; to appear as defenders of the national interests of the country especially against the United States; to identify the Communist

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movement with the hopes and aspirations of various groups in the community and to gain as wide a popular following as feasible; where possible to participate in government. This course of action may greatly increase the popular vote for the Communist party; it facilitates the formation of "front" organizations and the extension of Communist influence over many non-Communist groups; it enlarges the party, often at the expense of discipline, coherence, and consistency in the party line.

45. In those countries where the Communist party is outlawed a free choice between those courses of action is impossible. In many other important non-Communist countries the Communist party is too weak, or it has been rendered too unpopular, for the second alternative to yield substantial advantages: this is true in the US, the UK, West Germany, Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, and in most of the Middle East save Iran.

46. The countries where the Communist choice between these capabilities is most significant are France and Italy, and, to a slightly less degree, Iran, India, Indonesia, and Iceland. According to circumstances the Communists can to a greater or lesser degree establish themselves as the leaders and protectors of large numbers of disaffected, discontented, or rebellious people who are not themselves Communists. From such a position of vantage the Communists can frequently serve the interests of the Bloc by frustrating the policies of the governments concerned. In some countries they can achieve a high degree of control over the government, as they have done in Guatemala, British Guiana,

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and Indonesia. In every case, where this course of action is chosen, it presents the Communists with a further wide range of choice between tactical alternatives-- how to vote on certain issues; how far to support and how far to frustrate government decisions; how far to compromise Communist ideology for the sake of gaining non-Communist support; when to erode and when to expand their force.

47. Outside the narrowly-defined field of politics, the Communists have many alternative courses of action open to them in the tactical operation of those front organizations which they influence or control. Communist dominance of important labor federations in France, Italy, and Latin America gives the capability of calling damaging strikes. Similar domination of labor unions in various countries offers similar possibilities of less scope. Communists can select the times and circumstances for staging protest movements, petitions, street riots, and the like. They can determine, to a great degree, how far their influence shall be overt and how far covert.

Diplomacy

48. The resources and techniques of diplomacy are traditional; the Bloc has no extraordinary capabilities in this field. Within the limits prescribed by circumstances Bloc leaders can, like the leaders of other great

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powers, decide whether or not to negotiate on given issues, whether to do so secretly or publicly, whether to do so with the purpose of reaching or not reaching agreement, whether to delay or hasten the proceedings. The exigencies of the situation may at one time force them to negotiate in such a way as to minimize the effects of weakness; at other times it may permit them to capitalize on a position of strength.

49. Bloc leaders have shown virtually no desire for serious negotiation to reach agreement on major issues with the non-Communist powers. They appear to have recognized, however, that Western peoples place faith in international negotiations, and that a complete refusal by the Bloc to engage in diplomacy would have adverse repercussions in the Communist position. Hence they have been active in all varieties of "open" negotiation, including participation in the proceedings of the United Nations. Not expecting usually to arrive at any useful agreement, they have made such negotiations a vehicle for propaganda. They have also frequently contrived, in accordance with well-established diplomatic technique, to make negotiations come to a standstill on some subordinate issue, which can be plausibly represented as arising from the obstinacy not of themselves but of the non-Communist powers. Such courses of action will remain open to the Communist leaders.

50. In conducting relations with non-Communist states, the sparing use which the Bloc has made of secret diplomacy, by contrast with the frequency and fruitlessness of its participation in highly publicized conferences, has rendered the former mode of procedure peculiarly significant. In general, when the Bloc

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desires no agreement to be reached it can throw the negotiations into some public or semi-public arena and make them an occasion for propaganda; when it means business it engages in confidential exchanges. We have lately seen a tendency for the USSR to employ the confidential procedure somewhat more frequently: most significantly in advances to French and British officials. We believe the Bloc may carry on open diplomacy primarily as an aspect of propaganda warfare, while reserving more serious and significant negotiations for conventional diplomatic channels.

Military

51. The Bloc is capable of initiating and waging prolonged general war against any or all states of the non-Communist world. It is also capable of initiating and waging local war in territories on the periphery of the Bloc. It is capable of air attack against any points on the Eurasian continent, North Africa, and most of North America. It is not capable of large-scale and long-range amphibious or seaborne attacks.

52. The Soviet Army now consists of about 2,500,000 men, organized into about 175 divisions. The estimated maximum mobilization potential by H-plus-30 days is about 7,500,000 men organized into 300 line divisions; by H-plus-360 days about 12,500,000 men. Satellite armies now contain about 1,286,000 men in 75 divisions; the Chinese Communist Field Forces number about 2,380,000 men. Operations within the capabilities of these Bloc ground forces may be illustrated as follows (all these operations would have tactical air support and could be carried on either separately or concurrently):

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(a) In Western Europe the Bloc could attack, virtually without warning, with the 22 Soviet divisions now stationed in East Germany, supported by the additional 8 Soviet divisions stationed in the Satellites and by Satellite troops -- the latter being employed in secondary roles.

(b) Assuming redeployment and at least partial prior mobilization, the Bloc could launch an invasion of Western Europe with from 75 to 120 divisions. Preparations for such an attack almost certainly would become known to Western intelligence organizations.

(c) Similarly, attacks could be launched by Soviet and Satellite troops against Yugoslavia or Turkey, and by Soviet troops against Iran, virtually without warning if the troops already deployed near those countries were used, and in greater strength according to the degree of prior mobilization and redeployment. However, we believe that an attack against Yugoslavia, Turkey, Western Europe, or Berlin by Satellite forces alone, without the overt participation of Soviet combat forces, will not be a course of action open to the Bloc within the period of this estimate, primarily because the reliability of Satellite forces is too uncertain.

(d) About 150,000 Chinese Communist troops are now in a position to intervene in Indochina, and at least 125,000 could be logistically supported in such an intervention.

(c) We believe that the Bloc could launch an amphibious invasion of Japan with an initial assault strength of one airborne division plus two or three waterborne divisions, and with approximately six divisions supporting.

53. Bloc Air Forces have a total of about 20,000 aircraft, of which approximately one-half are fighters, one-fourth bombers, and one-fourth attack and transport types. The largest bomber the Bloc now has in operating units is the TU-4, which is estimated to have under normal operating conditions a combat radius of 1,700 nautical miles and a combat range of 3,100 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load. The capabilities of Bloc air forces (apart from their capabilities in tactical support of troops) may be illustrated as follows:

(a) Using TU-4 aircraft, the USSR could reach all parts of the US. The USSR has enough TU-4 aircraft to carry its entire stock of nuclear weapons. However, even a stripped-down TU-4 could reach only the extreme northwestern corner of the US on two-way missions without aerial refuelling. Even with aerial refuelling and other range-extension techniques, attack upon the northeast industrial area and upon most of the principal strategic bases almost certainly would involve the expenditure of the attacking aircraft and most of the crews on one-way missions.

(b) By mid-1955 the USSR may have a heavy bomber available, in numbers up to about 200. Such an aircraft would be capable of reaching most of the strategically important areas in the US on

~~Two-way~~ missions. We have no evidence that such a bomber is yet in production, though a prototype has been seen.

(c) The USSR could undertake air operations concurrently against the US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and the offshore island chain of Asia.

(d) We believe that the Bloc could provide vigorous air opposition against air attacks on critical targets in the interior of the USSR under conditions of good visibility. Under clear moonlit night conditions, Bloc defense capabilities are fair against piston bombers and negligible against jet bombers. Under conditions of poor visibility, day or night, Bloc interception capabilities are negligible.

54. Bloc naval strength centers about 6 effective heavy cruisers, 15 effective light cruisers, 166 effective destroyers and 348 submarines, of which 112 are long-range (combat radius of 1,000 - 1,500 nautical miles). By mid-1955 we believe that the number of light cruisers will be increased to 21, of effective fleet destroyers to 163, and of long-range submarines to 149. The capabilities of the Soviet naval force may be illustrated as follows:

(a) The Soviet submarine force could undertake offensive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategically vital sea lanes.

(b) Employing mines, the USSR could seriously interfere with allied sea communications, in an effort including all the ports

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and approaches of the UK and Western Europe, together with most of the vital Allied ports and sea lanes around the perimeter of the Bloc in the Far East.

(c) The Bloc is incapable of surface naval operations of large size or scope, though it is developing cruiser and destroyer forces adequate for raiding operations.

ALLOCATION OF BLOC RESOURCES

55. In pursuing its objective of weakening and disrupting the non-Communist world Bloc effort is continuous but by no means uniform in direction or intensity. Even the full non-military resources of the Bloc are seldom brought to bear in the East-West struggle, because many of them are too valuable, and are built up with too much difficulty, to risk their dissipation in unsuccessful or unprofitable use. Propaganda can be employed very freely without such risk, but to implement Communist capabilities for sabotage, armed revolt, violence, political strikes, or the frustration of government action in Western countries, is to invite the destruction of the resources which make these courses of action possible. Accordingly, the choice among areas and issues of concentration is one of the most important confronting Bloc leaders.

56. In the Far East, the Bloc has come nearest to employing its full resources during the past several years. The Chinese Communists are capable of renewing military operations in Korea, and of invading

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Indochina or Burma. They could increase their present covert support of the Viet Minh movement, without overt participation in combat. Apart from these important capabilities, however, we do not believe that the Bloc has significant offensive courses of action open to it in the Far East which it is not already pursuing to the fullest possible extent.

57. In Western Europe, on the other hand, we believe that the Bloc has non-military resources substantially above those now being used. Propaganda and diplomacy have been and are being extensively employed in the attempt to prevent the rearmament of West Germany and the integration of that country into the Western alliance. Bloc leaders could add to these procedures a formidable campaign of sabotage, violence, strikes, and political action by local Communist parties and Communist sympathizers. They are furthermore capable of using threats of war, coupled perhaps with a propaganda campaign based on the dread of nuclear weapons. At the opposite extreme they are capable, to a far greater degree than hitherto, of demonstrating such mildness and conciliation as would be calculated to quiet fears of Communist imperialism and give opportunity for concentration on the old-established menace of Germany.

58. In Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, Bloc resources are small compared with those in Europe and the Far East. The Bloc can carry on propaganda calculated to increase tensions in these areas and heighten resentment of the US and the principal European countries.

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We do not believe, however, that Communist capabilities for offensive action in these regions, apart from propaganda, will be great during the period of this estimate. The main choice before Bloc leaders with respect to these areas is as to the amount of effort and resources that shall be put into building up Communist strength -- training cadres, establishing contacts and communications, and perfecting organization.

59. In Latin America, as in Western Europe, the Communists possess resources for strikes, sabotage, and violence which are largely unused. At present in Guatemala, and perhaps during the period of this estimate in other countries, Communists will actually have the capability of taking over the government, but implementation of this capability would only be at grave risk of powerful counteraction from other American states. Meanwhile the Communists can indulge in propaganda, and can form alliances with various nationalist, intellectual, and organized labor groups in opposition to the influence of the US.